Article ID: | iaor2009586 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 4 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 57 |
End Page Number: | 68 |
Publication Date: | Feb 1996 |
Journal: | Central European Journal of Operations Research |
Authors: | Heuer Gerald A., Leopold-Wildburger Ulrike, Mller Oskar |
The structure of a Silverman game can be explained easily: each of two players independently selects a number out of a predetermined set. The higher number wins unless it is too high. In this case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. Interesting behavioural questions can be raised in the context of this two-person experiment with only three possible outcomes, namely one, zero and minus one. The result show that the participants of the experiment recognized more than only (first order) dominance and the average behaviour in one round was very close to an optimal one.