| Article ID: | iaor2009585 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 4 |
| Issue: | 1 |
| Start Page Number: | 25 |
| End Page Number: | 56 |
| Publication Date: | Feb 1996 |
| Journal: | Central European Journal of Operations Research |
| Authors: | Bomze Immanuel M. |
Evolutionary ‘games’ were introduced some 20 years ago by biologists with the aim to explain phenomena like polymorphism of behaviour in animal societies where individuals have neither conscience; nor rationality; nor expectations; nor even the choice between several behaviour patterns since these were thought to be genetically determined. The role of evolutionary stability as a solution concept in classical game theory which assumes rational actors trying to anticipate the opponents' actions, seems to be not yet fully understood. One of the aims of this article is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the basic facts of evolutionary stability. The paper may also be used as a very short crash course on what has become fashionable as ‘evolutionary game theory’, with a strong emphasis on dynamical aspects, which seem to be the most attractive features in this field which today receives increasing attention in economic theory.