Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value

Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value

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Article ID: iaor2009581
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 158
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 143
End Page Number: 159
Publication Date: Feb 2008
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors: , ,
Abstract:

In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory.

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