An equitable solution for multicriteria bargaining games

An equitable solution for multicriteria bargaining games

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Article ID: iaor20084659
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 177
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 1523
End Page Number: 1534
Publication Date: Mar 2007
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: decision theory: multiple criteria
Abstract:

In this paper we study bargaining models where the agents consider several criteria to evaluate the results of the negotiation process. We propose a new solution concept for multicriteria bargaining games based on the distance to a utopian minimum level vector. This solution is a particular case of the class of the generalized leximin solutions and can be characterized as the solution of a finite sequence of minimax programming problems.

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