Electoral strategies in a dynamical democratic system. Geometric models

Electoral strategies in a dynamical democratic system. Geometric models

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Article ID: iaor20083971
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 175
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 870
End Page Number: 878
Publication Date: Dec 2006
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , , ,
Keywords: programming: geometric
Abstract:

We consider a problem of Political Economics with two opposed political parties. They will attempt to capture the greatest number of voters of a discrete population of elements. It is supposed that these parties can modify in their policies to a certain degree. Our purpose is to determine the optimum position or positions for the party in terms of guaranteeing the maximum number of voters. We will apply the techniques of Computational Geometry.

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