| Article ID: | iaor20083920 |
| Country: | Netherlands |
| Volume: | 172 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Start Page Number: | 588 |
| End Page Number: | 603 |
| Publication Date: | Jul 2006 |
| Journal: | European Journal of Operational Research |
| Authors: | Roubens Marc, Rusinowska Agnieszka, Swart Harrie de |
| Keywords: | game theory |
In the paper, we present an application of the MACBETH approach to a certain model of coalition formation. We apply the MACBETH technique to quantify the attractiveness and repulsiveness of possible governments to parties. We use this method to calculate the utilities of governments to parties. Based on these utilities, stable governments are determined. In the paper, an adequate example is presented.