Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration

Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration

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Article ID: iaor20082477
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 110
Issue: 1/2
Start Page Number: 85
End Page Number: 96
Publication Date: Jan 2007
Journal: International Journal of Production Economics
Authors: , ,
Keywords: Stackelberg game
Abstract:

A key issue in supply chain design for manufacturing firms is how to make a trade-off between strategies of vertical integration and outsourcing. A two-echelon supply chain model with one supplier and one manufacturer is set up to study this issue. The manufacturer makes decisions on two types of capacities, one is core capacity that cannot be outsourced, the other is non-core capacity on which the manufacturer implements a strategy that includes three options – complete, partial or no outsourcing. Such a strategy is referred to as ‘flexibility of backward integration’. Optimal capacity decisions of the manufacturer are given and the supplier’s pricing strategies are discussed. Managerial implications of partial outsourcing are investigated. The impact of the flexibility of backward integration is presented and finally, supply chain coordination is analyzed.

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