The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games

The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games

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Article ID: iaor2007903
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 61
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 1
End Page Number: 19
Publication Date: Aug 2006
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors:
Keywords: Bayesian modelling
Abstract:

In a seminal paper, Aumann showed how the choices of rational players could be analyzed in a unified state space framework. His innovation was to include the choices of the players in the description of the states, thus abolishing Savage's distinction between acts and consequences. But this simplification comes at a price: Aumann's notion of Bayes rationality does not allow players to evaluate what would happen were they to deviate from their actual choices. We show how the addition of a causal structure to the framework enables us to analyze such counterfactual statements, and use it to introduce a notion of causal rationality. Under a plausible causal independence condition, the two notions are shown to be equivalent. If we are prepared to accept this condition we can dispense with the causal apparatus and retain Aumann's original framework.

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