Two-person zero-sum stochastic games

Two-person zero-sum stochastic games

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Article ID: iaor19911658
Country: Switzerland
Volume: 28
Start Page Number: 135
End Page Number: 152
Publication Date: Apr 1991
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors:
Abstract:

Two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are considered. The expected average payoff criterion is introduced. In the special case of single controller games it is shown that the optimal stationary policies and the value of the game can be obtained from the optimal solutions to a pair of dual programs. For multichain structures, a decomposition algorithm is given which produces such optimal stationary policies for both players. In the case of both players controlling the transitions, a generalized game is obtained, the solution of which gives the optimal policies.

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