The stability of a finite cooperative game with the parametric concept of equilibrium (‘from Pareto to Nash’)

The stability of a finite cooperative game with the parametric concept of equilibrium (‘from Pareto to Nash’)

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Article ID: iaor2007341
Country: Belarus
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 9
End Page Number: 11
Publication Date: Jan 2006
Journal: Doklady of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus
Authors: ,
Abstract:

A parametric concept of equilibrium in a finite cooperative game of several players is introduced. The concept is determined by partitioning a player set into coalitions. Pareto optimal situation and Nash equilibrium situation correspond to two special cases of such a partition. Bounds are found for such perturbations of parameters of players linear payoff functions that do not yield the appearance of new efficient situations.

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