Personality in dictator and ultimatum games

Individuals differ in bargaining behavior since neither their ethical constraints and concerns for equity, their attitudes towards risk, nor their analytical talents are the same. In an experimental prephase we tried to elicit such differences by confronting participants with suitable one-person-decision problems. In the main phase they played successively the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and finally the combination of the former two. A final questionnaire elicits self-evaluations concerning basic personality traits. We mainly investigate the consistency of prior dispositions (inferred from prephase behavior and from self-reports) and actual behavior (in the main phase), where we focus on the effects of three individual difference variables (benevolence, reciprocity orientation, and intelligence). Benevolence (as personality trait of the proposer) facilitates equity considerations in his/her offers to the powerless, but not to the powerful recipient. Reciprocity orientation induces powerful recipients to set higher acceptable thresholds. Intelligence has no significant effects on bargaining behavior.