Optimal equilibria in the non-coperative game associated with cost spanning tree problems

Optimal equilibria in the non-coperative game associated with cost spanning tree problems

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Article ID: iaor2006295
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 137
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 101
End Page Number: 115
Publication Date: Jul 2005
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: networks
Abstract:

We study the Pareto optimal equilibria payoffs of the non-cooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem. We give two characterisations of these payoffs: one based on the tree they induce and another based on the strategies played by the agents. Moreover, an algorithm for computing all these payoffs is provided.

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