Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20053262
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 39
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 241
End Page Number: 252
Publication Date: Apr 2005
Journal: Decision Support Systems
Authors: , ,
Keywords: bidding
Abstract:

In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.