Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations

Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20053197
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 160
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 252
End Page Number: 267
Publication Date: Jan 2005
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

Negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere are modeled as extensive games of perfect information. Various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, reaction function equilibrium, correlated equilibrium and bargaining solutions are applied, analyzed and computed. Special reduction techniques are used when the size of the game tree becomes excessive. A new solution concept, the tree-correlated equilibrium, is also introduced. Main features of an Excel add-in designed to compute various solutions are briefly discussed and a sample policy analysis for a special negotiating scenario is discussed.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.