Sequential scoring rules, the majority principle and unimodal preferences

Sequential scoring rules, the majority principle and unimodal preferences

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Article ID: iaor20052479
Country: France
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 347
End Page Number: 362
Publication Date: Jul 2000
Journal: RAIRO Operations Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: voting
Abstract:

Sequential scoring rules are multi-stage social choice rules that work as follows: at each stage of the process, a score is computed for each alternative by taking into account its position in the individual preference rankings, and the alternative with the lowest score is eliminated. The current paper studies the ability of these rules for choosing the Condorcet winner (or the strong Condorcet winner) when individual preferences are single-peaked.

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