Article ID: | iaor20052456 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 159 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 705 |
End Page Number: | 728 |
Publication Date: | Dec 2004 |
Journal: | European Journal of Operational Research |
Authors: | Kort Peter M., Huisman Kuno J.M. |
Keywords: | economics, game theory |
This paper studies a dynamic duopoly in which firms compete in the adoption of new technologies. The innovation process is exogenous to the firms. It is assumed that there are two technologies. Technology 1 already exists at time zero and can be adopted any time at a given one-time cost. This is standard and leads to a preemption game. What is new in the paper is the presence of technology 2 that becomes available for adoption at some unknown time in the future. Technology 2 is superior to technology 1 but firms cannot adopt it if they have adopted technology 1 before technology 2 arrives. The motivation to analyze a setup like this is that it provides a framework where firms take into account technological progress in making their investment decisions. Clearly this topic is important and also the results show that the addition of a superior technology appearing somewhere in the future can have substantial implications for the optimal investment decision. Adding technology 2 to the model delays investment, and could, in case of a high arrival probability, turn the preemption game into a war of attrition. Another main result is that revenue uncertainty induces the adoption of the more modern technology 2.