The dimension for the Europen Union Council under the Nice rules

The dimension for the Europen Union Council under the Nice rules

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20052227
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 156
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 415
End Page Number: 419
Publication Date: Jul 2004
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors:
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

In this note it is proved that the European Union enlargement voting system under two different decision rules (simple majority of countries or qualified majority of 2/3) adopted in the Nice European summit, held in December 2000, has exactly dimension 3. This result clarifies that these voting systems cannot realize either as a weighted voting system or as the interaction of two weighted voting systems and, therefore, it is useful to prove the existence of well-known real voting systems of dimension 3.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.