Article ID: | iaor20052025 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 6 |
Issue: | 4 |
Start Page Number: | 302 |
End Page Number: | 320 |
Publication Date: | Sep 2004 |
Journal: | Manufacturing & Service Operations Management |
Authors: | Klastorin T., Tsai W. |
Keywords: | pricing |
In this paper, we consider the case when two profit-maximizing firms enter a new market with a competing product that has a finite (and known) life cycle. Both firms make design decisions simultaneously without information about the other firm's decisions. The order of entry is a function of the two firms' product design levels and design capabilities. The first firm entering the market sets a monopoly price for its product and enjoys a monopoly situation until the second firm enters the market. When the second firm enters the market, both firms simultaneously set (or reset) their product prices knowing the design of both products at that time (and we assume those prices are fixed for the remainder of the product's life). We develop a game-theoretic model that represents the new product introduction process and show that a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium occurs under certain conditions defined by the expected product life span, product cost, development time, and customer preferences. Our model shows that product differentiation always arises at equilibrium due to the joint effects of resource utilization, price competition, and product life cycle. A critical parameter for our model is a product-specific index