Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core

Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20051887
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 154
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 609
End Page Number: 625
Publication Date: May 2004
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: programming: linear
Abstract:

We study the relation between the core of a given controlled committee LP-game and the set of payoff vectors generated by shadow prices and core allocations of those simple games describing the control over the different resources. The central problem we tackle is the convergence of the core of LP-games with committee control to the set of competitive equilibria, which we define as the set previously described, as the number of players increases uniformly.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.