Article ID: | iaor20051602 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 39 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 23 |
End Page Number: | 39 |
Publication Date: | Mar 2005 |
Journal: | Decision Support Systems |
Authors: | Iwasaki Atsushi, Yokoo Makoto, Terada Kenji |
Keywords: | auctions |
This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has the following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, and (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal values of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily on the Internet. This is the first protocol that has both of these characteristics. Our simulation results indicate that the developed protocol obtains a social surplus close to Pareto efficient.