A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

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Article ID: iaor20051602
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 39
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 23
End Page Number: 39
Publication Date: Mar 2005
Journal: Decision Support Systems
Authors: , ,
Keywords: auctions
Abstract:

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has the following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, and (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal values of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily on the Internet. This is the first protocol that has both of these characteristics. Our simulation results indicate that the developed protocol obtains a social surplus close to Pareto efficient.

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