Contracting in a supply chain with stochastic demand and substitute products

Retailers often stock competing products from multiple manufacturers. When the retailer stocks out of a particular item, customers who prefer the item are likely, with some probability, to switch to a substitute product from another manufacturer at the same store. In such an event, a “lost sale” for the manufacturer is not a “lost sale” for the retailer. This exacerbates difference in manufacturer's and retailer's stockout costs for the item. Such differences in stockout cost influence the optimal contract between the manufacturer and the retailer and also impose agency costs on the channel. Such contracts, in turn, determine equilibrium inventory levels and fill rates. We study these issues in a single-period supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, under three difference scenarios (when the two firms are integrated into a single entity, when the retailer makes stocking decisions, and when the manufacturer makes stocking decisions). We compare, and present a methodology for comparing, stocking quantities, manufacturer efforts, and supply chain profits across different scenarios. We find that vector managed inventory (VMI) performs better when manufacturer effort is a substantial driver of consumer demand and when consumers are unlikely to substitute to another brand in case of a stockout. On the other hand, if non-contractible manufacturer effort is unimportant, or when substitution is significant, VMI can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, channel inefficiencies, and can perform worse than traditional Retailer Managed Inventory.