The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring

The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20042786
Country: United States
Volume: 32
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 133
End Page Number: 150
Publication Date: Dec 2003
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: , ,
Abstract:

We study finite zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, at each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the state and his/her own action. We prove that the uniform max–min value always exists. Moreover, the uniform max–min value is independent of the information structure of player 2. Symmetric results hold for the uniform max–min value.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.