Repeated games, duality and the Central Limit Theorem

Repeated games, duality and the Central Limit Theorem

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Article ID: iaor20041723
Country: United States
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 237
End Page Number: 251
Publication Date: Feb 1996
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: duality
Abstract:

This paper is concerned with the repeated zero-sum games with one-sided information and standard signaling. We introduce here dual games that allow us to analyze the “Markovian” behavior of the uninformed player, and to explicitly compute his optimal strategies. We then apply our results on the dual games to explain the appearance of the normal density in the n–1/2 term of the asymptotic expansion of ν(n) as a consequence of the Central Limit Theorem.

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