Article ID: | iaor2004352 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 27 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 441 |
End Page Number: | 444 |
Publication Date: | May 2002 |
Journal: | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Authors: | Peleg B., Sudholter P. |
As shown by Peleg, the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual rationality, superadditivity, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and weak symmetry. It was not known whether weak symmetry was logically independent. With the help of a certain transitive 4-person transitive utility game, it is shown that weak symmetry is redundant in this result. Hence, the core on market games is axiomatized by the remaining five properties, if the universe of players contains at least four members.