Article ID: | iaor20033283 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 56 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 439 |
End Page Number: | 449 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2002 |
Journal: | Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Heidelberg) |
Authors: | Tijs Stef H., Voorneveld Mark, Grahn Sofia |
Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.