 
                                                                                | Article ID: | iaor20033278 | 
| Country: | Germany | 
| Volume: | 31 | 
| Issue: | 2 | 
| Start Page Number: | 269 | 
| End Page Number: | 283 | 
| Publication Date: | Jan 2002 | 
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory | 
| Authors: | Sotomayor M. | 
A labor market where firms and workers are heterogeneous and may form more than one partnership is considered. A natural concept of core for such markets, different from the concept used by Thompson, is defined. We show that the core is non-empty and is, in general, strictly greater than Thompson's core. Unlike Thompson, we found several dissimilarities between our model and the well known one-to-one case studied in Shapley and Shubik.