McCockerel measuring individual punishment and reciprocity in a simple value-laden dilemma game

In our study we intend to gain insight into the behavior of individuals in conflict situations which can be interpreted as sanctions. There are hardly any models of sanctions in the literature which can be compared with our idea. An experiment is modeled to analyze the behavior of individuals in a situation similar to a sequential prisoners' dilemma. Contingent decisions give us the chance to measure punishment and sanctions using one-shot games. Our approach is similar to an extended model by Bolton et al., which analyzed reciprocity in a single framework with the help of a questionnaire. In our paper we concentrate on whether the attitude towards fairness coincides with the attitude towards the application of sanctions. We will also observe whether fairness, gender and the effect of the economic education have an influence on the degree of punishment used. Results seem to indicate that the role assigned to each participant strongly influences her/his actions towards her/his counterpart. We suppose the reason for this behavior is that less experienced individuals think more positively about the payoffs for their competitors, while individuals with a higher level of economic education behave significantly more selfishly. Our objectives are to gain more insight into behavior in dilemma situations and also seek better explanations for individual decisions. Some of the results could help to understand problems concerned with sanctions.