| Article ID: | iaor2003695 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 54 |
| Issue: | 3 |
| Start Page Number: | 359 |
| End Page Number: | 371 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2001 |
| Journal: | Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Heidelberg) |
| Authors: | Borm Peter, Bilbao J.M., Algaba E., Lpez J.J. |
We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myerson value in this context are provided using the concept of basis for union stable systems. Moreover, TU-games restricted by union stable systems generalize graph-restricted games and games with permission structures.