| Article ID: | iaor2003686 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 30 |
| Issue: | 4 |
| Start Page Number: | 527 |
| End Page Number: | 538 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2001 |
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Authors: | Berger U. |
| Keywords: | Nash theory and methods |
In a role game, players can condition their strategies on their player position in the base game. If the base game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the set of Nash equilibria of the role game is globally asymptotically stable under the best response dynamics. If the base game is 2 × 2, then in the cyclic case the set of role game equilibria is a continuum. We identify a single equilibrium in this continuum that attracts all best response paths outside the continuum.