Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

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Article ID: iaor20021919
Country: Germany
Volume: 53
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 35
End Page Number: 49
Publication Date: Jan 2001
Journal: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Heidelberg)
Authors: ,
Abstract:

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.

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