Blackmailing the mayor: Using semi-formal state-based game theory methods to inform a security situation

Blackmailing the mayor: Using semi-formal state-based game theory methods to inform a security situation

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Article ID: iaor20021916
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 134
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 330
End Page Number: 345
Publication Date: Oct 2001
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors:
Keywords: urban affairs, politics
Abstract:

Security situations, with their combination of personal threat, difficulties of observation of that threat and apparent unpredictability present particular difficulties for decision support. Candidate decision support approaches deriving from behavioural analysis (security studies) or economic game theory are either too specific to be easily transferred or too general to provide appropriate action and sensemaking plans for security advisers. An application of a business strategy tool for conflict analysis between companies (Powergraph) is made to a real-life security situation, that of the blackmail of a regional politician in Southern Europe. The method can be seen to provide a promising basis for real-time support in such situations.

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