Replication invariance on non-transferable utility games

Replication invariance on non-transferable utility games

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Article ID: iaor20021350
Country: Germany
Volume: 29
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 473
End Page Number: 486
Publication Date: Jan 2000
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: , ,
Abstract:

Two concepts of replication (conflictual and non-conflictual) are extended from the class of pure bargaining games to the class of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The behavior of the Harsanyi, Shapley NTU, Egalitarian and Maschler–Owen solutions of the replica games is compared with that of the Nash and Egalitarian solutions in pure bargaining games.

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