| Article ID: | iaor20013604 |
| Country: | Netherlands |
| Volume: | 101 |
| Issue: | 1/3 |
| Start Page Number: | 1 |
| End Page Number: | 12 |
| Publication Date: | Apr 2000 |
| Journal: | Discrete Applied Mathematics |
| Authors: | Baou Mourad, Balinski Michel |
| Keywords: | education |
The major results known for the marriage and university admissions problems, the one-to-one and many-to-one stable matching problems, are shown to have equivalents in the general many-to-many setting. Some of these results depend upon a particular, natural definition of individual preferences over sets of mates: notably, characterizations of ‘optimal’ stable assignments in terms of ‘efficiency’, ‘monotonicity’, and ‘strategy-proofness’.