| Article ID: | iaor20013522 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 52 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Start Page Number: | 221 |
| End Page Number: | 236 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2000 |
| Journal: | Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Heidelberg) |
| Authors: | Borm P., Bilbao J.M., Algaba E., Lpez J.J. |
In this paper, we study the position value for games in which partial cooperation exists, that is based on a union stable coalition system. The concept of basis is introduced for these systems, allowing for a definition of the position value. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the position value is provided for a specific class of union stable systems. Conditions under which convexity is inherited from the underlying game to the conference game, and the position value is a core vector of the restricted game are provided.