| Article ID: | iaor20013509 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 29 |
| Issue: | 3 |
| Start Page Number: | 359 |
| End Page Number: | 364 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2000 |
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Authors: | Sorin S., Beaud J.-P. |
We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either (a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or (b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We show: (1) that situation (b) is always (weakly) better than (a), (2) that it can be strictly better in some cases, (3) that the two cases are equivalent if the long uninformed player has an optimal strategy independent of his own moves.