Advance-purchase discounts and price discrimination in competitive markets

Advance-purchase discounts and price discrimination in competitive markets

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Article ID: iaor2001592
Country: United States
Volume: 106
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 395
End Page Number: 422
Publication Date: Apr 1998
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Authors:
Keywords: yield management
Abstract:

When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price-taking firms may offer advance-purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance because the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance-purchase sales are made to low-valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second-degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power.

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