Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces

Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces

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Article ID: iaor20002300
Country: Germany
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 65
End Page Number: 76
Publication Date: Jan 1999
Journal: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Heidelberg)
Authors:
Keywords: Nash theory and methods
Abstract:

We consider stochastic games with countable state spaces and unbounded immediate payoff functions. Our assumptions on the transition structure of the game are based on a recent work by Meyn and Tweedie on computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains. The main results in this paper concern the existence of sensitive optimal strategies in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. By sensitive optimality we mean overtaking or 1-optimality. We also provide a new Nash equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with denumerable state spaces.

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