A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem

A note on efficient solutions for the linear bilevel programming problem

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20001830
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 112
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 427
End Page Number: 431
Publication Date: Jan 1999
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors:
Keywords: bilevel programming
Abstract:

The solutions of linear bilevel programming problems frequently are non-Pareto-optimal. The potential increase in payoffs generated by Pareto improvements makes it worthwhile to consider methods with which to move the solution to the efficient frontier. Bargaining models offer one class of solutions, which, contrary to the original non-cooperative, sequential decision-making situation, however, assume cooperation. We make an attempt to maintain the original power structure by introducing the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.