| Article ID: | iaor1990251 |
| Country: | United States |
| Volume: | 37 |
| Issue: | 6 |
| Start Page Number: | 972 |
| End Page Number: | 980 |
| Publication Date: | Nov 1989 |
| Journal: | Operations Research |
| Authors: | Livne Zvi A. |
The Raiffa Solution to the Bargaining Problem, proposed in 1951, has several appealing properties, especially when viewed as a model of the negotiation process in an integrative bargaining situation. Unlike the well known solutions of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky, the Raiffa Solution has not been characterized by a set of axioms. The paper presents two axiomatic characterizations of the Raiffa Solution. In addition, it presents a new axiomatic characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution.