| Article ID: | iaor19992511 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 27 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Start Page Number: | 245 |
| End Page Number: | 256 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 1998 |
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Authors: | Tijs S., Nouweland A. van den, Dutta B. |
In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures.