On consistent solutions for strategic games

On consistent solutions for strategic games

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Article ID: iaor19992506
Country: Germany
Volume: 27
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 191
End Page Number: 200
Publication Date: Jan 1998
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: , , ,
Keywords: Nash theory and methods
Abstract:

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. There are other solutions, like the ϵ-Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of ‘personalized’ Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.

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