The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

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Article ID: iaor19992497
Country: Germany
Volume: 27
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 37
End Page Number: 47
Publication Date: Jan 1998
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: , , ,
Abstract:

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet.

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