Article ID: | iaor19992497 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 27 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 37 |
End Page Number: | 47 |
Publication Date: | Jan 1998 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Tijs S., Borm P., Otten G.-J., Peleg B. |
The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet.