Stable transitions from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured survival

This paper treats the strategic offensive and defensive forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. It addresses the problem of transitioning from the current state of mutual assured destruction to a future state of mutual assured survival. The paper identifies sequences of two-sided force structures which possess the properties that (1) neither side has positive first strike payoff and (2) there is no incentive to strike first in a crisis. These properties correspond, respectively, to arms race stability and crisis stability. The paper treats both ballistic missile and air-breathing offensive forces and SDI and air defenses against them. A mathematical model is presented which includes an optimized counterforce/countervalue first strike followed by a countervalue second strike with the surviving forces. First strike payoff and crisis instability measures are defined. Data on offensive forces and air defenses are presented. Assumptions are made on counterforce probabilities of kill and on numbers of weapons required to achieve destruction of value targets.