Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility

This paper presents the optimal allocation and backup of computing resources in a multidivisional firm in the presence of asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility. A game-theoretic model is developed and transformed to a linear programming problem. The solution to this linear programming problem enables the corporate headquarters to design a resource allocation scheme such that the revelation principle prevails and all divisions tell the truth. To cope with the combinatorial explosion of complexity caused by the resource constraint, a greedy-type algorithm and an averaged version of the original linear programming problem are developed to provide the upper and lower bounds. The greedy-type algorithm generates exact solutions for a wide range of instances. The lower bounds coincide with the exact solutions for the cases where the computer resource is either scarce or abundant. The averaged-version resource allocation model with slight modifications solves the optimal computer backup capacity problem. It determines how much back up capacity the firm should purchase when the firm's computer breaks down.