Article ID: | iaor19982904 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 26 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 335 |
End Page Number: | 351 |
Publication Date: | Jan 1997 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Felsenthal D.S., Machover M. |
Keywords: | voting |
We define ternary voting games (TVGs), a generalization of simple voting games (SVGs). In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In a TVG a third option is added: abstention. Every SVG can be regarded as a (somewhat degenerate) TVG; but the converse is false. We define appropriate generalizations of the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices for TVGs. We define also the responsiveness (or degree of democratic participation) of a TVG and determine, for each