Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs considered one-machine sequencing situations where each job is owned by one agent. They assumed that each group of agents (coalition) that is a subset of the grand coalition N can minimize its costs by making admissible rearrangements with respect to a given initial queue. This paper studies generalized sequencing situations. In a generalized sequencing situation only the subcoalitions of a fixed set M, with M ⊂ N, can minimize their costs by admissible rearrangements. In such an admissible rearrangement a coalition S can assign new positions to players outside M. These players will be compensated by S with respect to the position in the initial queue. For generalized sequencing situations we introduce the class of generalized sequencing games. For these games we provide nice expressions for the Shapley value, the τ-value and the &bgr;-value.
