A study of concurrent decision-making protocols in the design of a metal cutting tool using monotonicity arguments

In this paper, the objective is to study game-theoretic approaches for concurrent decision-making in engineering systems when well-defined, quantitative models are available to represent the different stages in the product life-cycle. The design and operation of a single-point metal cutting tool is used as an illustrative case-study and explicit models are developed for the design and operation stages of the life-cycle of the tool. Monotonicities in these two models have been evaluated symbolically and numerically, leading to the deduction of active constraints and the convenient computation of the rational reaction sets of the two players. Cooperative (Pareto), non-cooperative (Nash) and leader-follower (Stackelberg) solutions are obtained which show that the unique Pareto solution coincides with the Stackelberg strategy when Design is the leader but this is not necessarily the case when Manufacturing is the leader.