Bilateral comparisons and consistend fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Bilateral comparisons and consistend fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

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Article ID: iaor19972471
Country: Germany
Volume: 26
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 11
End Page Number: 25
Publication Date: Jan 1997
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Abstract:

The authors analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, they build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. The authors find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

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