An axiomatization of the core of market games

An axiomatization of the core of market games

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor1989643
Country: United States
Volume: 14
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 448
End Page Number: 456
Publication Date: Aug 1989
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: economics
Abstract:

The paper provides an axiomatization of the core of market games (totally balanced coalitional games). It proves that the core is fully characterized by the following five independent properties: (i) nonemptiness; (ii) individual rationality; (ii) superadditivity; (iv) the weak reduced game property; and (v) the converse reduced game property. Also, the paper considers a possible alternative characterization.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.