Network games; adaptations to Nash-Cournot equilibrium

Network games; adaptations to Nash-Cournot equilibrium

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Article ID: iaor19971505
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 64
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 179
End Page Number: 195
Publication Date: Jun 1996
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

The authors consider nonlinear flow problems involving noncooperative agents, all active in the same network. To find Nash equilibria, they develop an algorithm that lends itself to decentralized computation and parallel processing. The algorithm, which proceeds in terms of iterative strategy adjustments, is, in essence, of subgradient type. One advantage of that type is the ease with which stochastic and nonsmooth data can be accommodated.

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